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Abstract: This article examines the implementation of 
shari >’ah bylaws as a response to the regional autonomy law 
passed in 1999 and their implications for religious 
minorities. Under this regional autonomy regulation, local 
governments at the district level have authority to issue 
their own regulations. There are three broad sets of issues 
in Indonesian shari >’ah bylaws: public order and social 
problems, religious skills and obligations, and religious 
symbolism. The article argues that the introduction of such 
bylaws has many negative implications for religious 
minorities in Indonesia. This is, it further argues, because 
many of religious minority groups are forced to observe the 
same regulations as mainstream Muslims. Shari>’ah bylaws, 
it goes on to say, have also caused discrimination against 
religious minorities. Attempts to keep wary eyes on the the 
negative implications of the enactment of shari>’ah bylaws 
need, therefore, to be undertaken. This responsibility is not 
in the hands of the government, but also Muslim 
communities at large. The Indonesian government must 
treat all social and religious groups equally, guaranteeing no 
discrimination against each of them. Muslim communities 
are deeply in need of exploring and practicing the 
substance, and not the formal aspects, of shari>’ah.  
Keywords: Shari >’ah bylaws, religious minorities,  
Ahmadiyah. 
Introduction 
The formalization of shari>’ah rules has been the subject of wide-
ranging debate in Indonesia, and also internationally. This is because 
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this idea has significant implications, politically and socially, not only 
for Muslims, but also for followers of other religions who live in 
Indonesia. Although the majority of Indonesians are Muslims, shari>’ah 
law has not been implemented formally in many regions in Indonesia. 
However, since the fall of President Soeharto and the New Order in 
1998, Indonesia has transitioned from an authoritarian regime to a 
democracy and undergone decentralization. Since that time, local 
governments have used their authority to create regional religious 
regulations (shari>’ah bylaws) that regulate religious norms1. Many 
regional authorities and proponents of shari>’ah bylaws used the 
reformasi era to formalize shari >’ah at the state level. 
It is important to note that 78 shari>’ah bylaws have already been 
ratified by regional authorities. More than 52 cities and regencies have 
applied these regulations at the regional level. This does not include 
draft or proposed legislation (raperda) or regent (Bupati) edicts, but does 
include the implementing regulations (qanun) in Aceh2. In general, 
these shari>’ah bylaws are concerned with three broad sets of issues: 
public order and social problems (such as prostitution, consumption of 
alcohol and gambling), religious skills and obligations (such as reading 
the Qur’a>n, paying zaka>t or alms or religious tax, and attending Friday 
prayers), and religious symbolism (such as the wearing of Muslim 
clothing).3 As Robin Bush writes, these shari>’ah bylaws attract 
significant attention from politicians, public figures, and intellectuals. 
This is because they raise a number of issues, including constitutional 
issues, discrimination (many of non Muslim felt threatened about 
shari>’ah bylaws), and governance4. The implementation of shari>’ah 
bylaws in Indonesia remains hotly contested. 
 
1 Melissa Crouch, “Religious regulations in Indonesia: failing vulnerable groups,” 
Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, vol. 43, no. 2 (2009), p. 53. 
2 Robin Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?,” in 
G. Fealy and S. White (eds), Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), p. 176. 
3 A. Salim, “Muslim Politics in Indonesia’s Democratisation: The Religious Majority 
and the Rights of Minorities in the Post-New Order Era,” in R.H. McLeod and A. 
MacIntyre (eds), Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), p. 126. 
4 Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations,” p. 175. 
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Some analysts argue that the enactment of shari>’ah bylaws reflects 
the fact that the majority of the Indonesian population is Muslim. 
However, others rebut this argument by pointing to the fact that 
Indonesia is not religious state, but a neutral state which embraces 
many religious and cultures. Hence, government must protect and 
promote the rights of all its citizens as well as prevent discrimination. 
This article examines the implementation of shari>’ah bylaws and their 
implications for religious minorities. Arguing that shari>’ah bylaws have 
a negative impact on religious minorities in Indonesia, it consists of 
three parts. The first part examines the background of the emergence 
of shari>’ah bylaws. The second part assesses the impact of shari>’ah 
bylaws on religious minorities’ rights. The third part provides some 
suggestions on how to protect the rights of religious minorities. 
The Background of the Emergence of Shari >> >>’ah Bylaws 
The process of democratization and regional autonomy which has 
taken place since the fall of the Soeharto regime has had both positive 
and negative effects for Indonesia. One the one hand, the fall of 
Soeharto opened many opportunities for Indonesians to be more 
actively engage in the process of political reform in a democratic way. 
The event also rebalanced the distribution of power between  central 
and regional government. Before the fall of Soeharto, central 
government  often treated regions as a government branch with no 
real authority. Then decentralization through regional autonomy 
became the policy and this made the government more effective, 
efficient, and democratic. On the other hand, the creation and 
implementation of shari>’ah bylaws (Perda Syariah) in many regions has 
been one of the ‘negative effects’ in the country which constitutionally 
declares itself as a religiously neutral state. This can be seen as an 
example of Islamic radical groups in Indonesia using democratic 
processes for an undemocratic purpose. 
In this respect, the regional religious regulations or shari >’ah bylaws 
actually emerged as a response to the regional autonomy law which 
was passed in 1999. Under this new regulation, local governments at 
the district level have authority to issue their own regulations. The 
central government cannot intervene in local administration5.  
 
5 Luthfi Assyaukanie, “The Rise of Religious Bylaws in Indonesia,” RSIS Commentaries, 
(22/2007). 

Ahmad Fuad Fanani
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 05, Number 01, June 2011 
20 
The enactment of the Decentralized Law in January 2001 
represents a fundamental change in the position and relationship 
between the central and local governments. But there are many 
weaknesses in its implementation. This is because the law itself does 
not make clear how it should be implemented, leaving the relationship 
between central government and the regions ambiguous. Besides, the 
Decentralization Law was labeled as contradictory, inadequate, and 
flawed.6 Another weakness was the central government only provided 
for relatively few checks and balances relevant to the passing of 
shari>’ah bylaws. The enormous power which was given by the central 
government to local authorities has gone too far, leaving room for the 
creation of unimportant laws. Ironically, some of the regulations from 
regions are about religious matters which are actually still under control 
of central government. Due to the lethargy of the central government 
to properly address this issue, these laws continue to operate.7  
Responding to this issue, Michael Buehler points out that the 
increasing number of the shari’ah bylaws is not just an indication of a 
conservative movement within the Indonesian Muslim community. 
This trend also reveals a change in the pattern of power accumulation 
and political corruption in Indonesian local politics.8 Indeed, as stated 
by Robin Bush, political leaders have been known to issue shari>’ah 
bylaws as a means of establishing their ‘Islamic’ credentials among 
their constituents.9 Many of local political leaders tend to use the 
autonomy laws to strengthen their position by pandering to the 
Muslim majority. By demonstrating support for Islam, although it only 
symbolic, Muslim voters will be easily convinced that these leaders will 
favor Islamic interests.  
The emergence of shari>’ah bylaws in many Indonesian regions can 
also be seen as a new form of the shari>’ah movement in Indonesia. 
This kind of movement emerged after the failure of the formalization 
of shari>’ah in national level. In 2002, the struggle of the 
implementation of shari>’ah at the central level has experienced a 
 
6 Crouch, “Religious Regulations in Indonesia,” pp. 55-56. 
7 Ibid., p. 56.  
8 M. Buehler, “The rise of Shari’a by-laws in Indonesian Districts: An Indication for 
Changing Patterns of Power Accumulation and Political Corruption,” South East Asia 
Research, vol. 16, no. 2 (2008), p. 256. 
9 Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations,” p. 188. 
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considerable setback. During deliberations on the process of amending 
the 1945 Constitution, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) 
rejected a proposal to insert the Jakarta Charter into the Constitution. 
The Jakarta Charter is an old constitutional amendment which 
recognised the obligation of Muslims to implement the shari>’ah in the 
country. The main factor behind this failure was a lack of supporters 
from mainstream political parties. There were only two small Islamic 
parties (the United Development Party and the Crescent Star Party) 
supported the proposal. In contrast, the nationalist parties in 
parliament and major Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama’ 
(NU) and Muhammadiyah opposed the idea.10 As a result, there is little 
prospect that shari>’ah could ever be formalised at the state level.  
The lack of support from other parties in parliament and Islamic 
organizations toward the notion of the enforcement of shari>’ah law 
closely correlates with the distinctive nature of Indonesian Islam. 
Although the majority of the Indonesian population is Muslim, the 
Islamic parties only won a small percentage of the vote and accordingly 
represent a vocal minority only. For example, in 1999 national election, 
both Islamic parties (the National Awakening Party and the National 
Mandate Party) and Islamist parties (the United Development Party, 
the Justice Party, and the Crescent and Star Party) only took 38 % of 
the vote. In 2004 the total votes gained by the combination of both the 
Islamic and Islamist parties were 38 %.11 The total votes of the 
nationalist parties (Democrat Party, Golkar Party and PDI-P Party) 
outnumbered those of the combination of both the Islamic and 
Islamist parties. This reminds us of the debate between the Islamic-
oriented politicians and the leading kebangsaan (nationalist) groups 
during the formative era in Indonesia. At that time, the nationalist 
groups won the debate and Pancasila (Five Principles) then became 
state ideology.12 Indeed, Pancasila clearly respects all six dominant 
religions in Indonesia and gives equal rights to all Indonesian people.  
It is important to note that though the struggle of the 
formalization of shari>’ah in national level ended in failure, the 
proponents of shari.’ah still carry on with their cause. In fact, they use 
 
10 Assyaukanie, “The Rise of Religious Bylaws in Indonesia”. 
11 Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations,” p. 182. 
12 G. Eliraz, Islam in Indonesia: Modernis, Radicalism, and the Middle East Dimension 
(Brighton & Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2004), pp. 78 -79. 
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local (provincial and district) parliaments, along with the introduction 
of autonomy packages and direct elections as the strategic way to 
formalize shari>’ah. This has resulted in the enactment of shari>’ah 
bylaws in dozens of provinces and districts throughout Indonesia.13 
Some national magazines in Indonesia such as Gatra and Tempo 
reported that the supporters of shari>’ah are pursuing a strategy of 
controlling districts before spreading shari>’ah to provincial and 
national levels. This strategy is described as “from village to city” and 
promoting shari>’ah through the slow lane.14 Clearly, the struggle to 
formalize shari>’ah remains alive. 
Moreover, the implementation of shari>’ah in Aceh has encouraged 
other regions in Indonesia to follow this success. After the central 
government allowed Aceh to implement shari>’ah through a special 
autonomy law, other regions began to imitate Aceh by introducing 
bylaws (perda), decrees (keputusan), instructions (instruksi), and circulars 
(surat edaran). All of these laws contain Islamic injunctions.15 In this 
regard, it is widely known that Aceh has been the pivotal inspiration 
and pioneer of the implementation of the shari>’ah bylaws in Indonesia. 
Advocates of shari>’ah sought to imitate Aceh’s example and insisted 
that the central government give them the same opportunity.16 
Although the social, political and historical background of Aceh in 
implementing shari>’ah bylaws is certainly different from other regions, 
advocates of shari>’ah thought that they deserved to have the same 
rights as Aceh. 
The Implications of Shari >> >>’ah Bylaws for Religious Minorities  
It has been asserted by the proponents of shari>’ah bylaws that 
because of the majority of Indonesians are Muslims, they have the 
rights to implement shari>’ah rules. They also contend that this 
 
13 N. Hasan, “Islamic Militancy, Shari’a Bylwas, and Democratic Consolidation in 
Post-Suharto Indonesia,” KULTUR: The Indonesian Journal for Muslim Cultures, vol. 4, no. 
2 (2009), p. 40.  
14 A. E. Hara, “Pancasila and the Perda Syari’ah Debates in the Post-Suharto Era: 
Toward a New Political Consensus,” in O. Atsushi et al. (eds), Islam In Contention: 
Rethinking Islam and State in Indonesia (Indonesia: The Wahid Institute – Japan: CSEAS – 
Taiwan: CAPAS, 2010), pp. 47-48. 
15 Salim, “Muslim Politics in Indonesia,” p. 126 
16 Hasan, “Islamic Militancy, Shari’a Bylwas,” p. 43. 
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demographic majority gives socio-cultural and political legitimacy to 
the implementation of Islamic principles as the basis of the state. 
Another reason for the demand of the implementation shari>’ah law is 
the contribution of Indonesian Muslims to the struggle against Dutch 
colonial power. Although there are many concerns about 
discriminations against minority groups in regions where shari>’ah has 
been introduced, they claim that shari>’ah is not harmful to minority 
groups.17 In addition, the proponents of shari>’ah bylaws also argue that 
the formalizing of shari>’ah has produced positive impacts, including 
increased security, increased charitable contributions, donations and 
gifts, and improved levels of religious piety.18 
However, as Moeslim Abdurrahman has said, when a shari>’ah 
bylaw is imposed, women, non-Muslim, and the poor will become the 
first victims of this regulation.19 This is because they have to follow a 
rigid interpretation of religious tenets which do not favor women and 
non-Muslims. The proponents of shari>’ah bylaws mostly favor a 
patriarchal perspective, placing Muslims as the first priority, and 
ignoring the existence of non-Muslims. Indeed, as Salim wrote, this 
implies that Muslims’ interests must be prioritized over the interests of 
other religious groups.20 As a result, the willingness of religious 
majority to impose the shari>’ah bylaws on all Indonesians will 
negatively affect the rights of religious minorities.  
The claim that Muslims have played the most important role in the 
struggle against colonial powers also leaves out the role of non-Muslim 
fighters that is not insignificant.21 Historical accounts of Indonesia’s 
independence also clearly acknowledge the contribution of all citizens. 
Actually, the tyranny of the majority over the minority is common 
phenomenon that often occurs in many regions in the world. Thus, 
 
17 Pramono U. Tanthowi, “Shari’a and the Fantasy of Nationalism in Post-Soeharto 
Indonesia,” KULTUR: The Indonesian Journal for Muslim Cultures, vol 4, no 2 (2009), pp. 
22-23. 
18 S. Kamil, “Progressive Shari’a Perspectives of Non-Muslim Minority Rights,” 
KULTUR: The Indonesian Journal for Muslim Cultures, vol 4, no 2 (2009), p. 135. 
19 Moeslim Abdurrahman, “Korban Pertama dari Penerapan Syariat adalah 
Perempuan,” www.islamlib.com, 16/9/2001. (Accessed on 6 June 2011). 
20 A. Salim, “The Shari’a Bylaws and Human Rights in Indonesia,” Studia Islamika, 
Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies, vol 15, no 1 (2008), p. 19. 
21 Tanthowi, “Shari’a and the Fantasy of Nationalism,” p. 23. 
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democracy and tolerance were proposed to reduce and avoid this 
negative phenomenon. 
Furthermore, it should be underlined that some aspects of the 
shari>’ah bylaws contravene Indonesia’s obligations to protect the right 
to religious freedom. For example, The instruction of the Major of Padang 
451.422/Binsos-III/2005 on the Obligation to Wear the Jilbab and Islamic 
Dress (for Muslims) and Suggested Attire (for Non Muslims) is certainly shows 
that the laws discriminate against vulnerable groups.22 Although Fauzi 
Bahar (the Major of Padang) often stated in many occasions that this 
bylaw does not apply to non-Muslims, anecdotal evidence shows that 
non-Muslims students are also required to wear the jilbab (veil/female 
head covering). If non-Muslim students want to ignore this regulation, 
they are not allowed to attend a class.23 As a consequence, a Christian 
student such as Fransiska Silalahi, had to wear a veil for three years at 
school.24 This type of situation would clearly subject non-Muslims in 
Padang to social-psychological pressure.  
Discrimination against religious minorities not only occurs in 
Padang, but also in other regions which implement shari >’ah bylaws. 
Research on “The implementation of shari>’ah in regional autonomy 
era: its implications toward civil rights, women rights, and non-Muslim 
rights” that was conducted by Center for the Study of Religion and 
Culture (CSRC) of the State Islamic University (Universitas Islam 
Negeri, UIN) Jakarta  provides a useful insight into the reach and 
impact of shari>’ah bylaws.25 CSRC studied six regions where shari>’a 
bylaws caused discrimination toward religious minorities. For example, 
many non-Muslim women were forced to wear Muslim female dress 
every Friday. Teachers and students at certain High Schools (Sekolah 
Menengah Umum, SMU) were also required to wear the veil. If they 
 
22 Crouch, “Religious Regulations in Indonesia,” pp. 81-82. 
23 M.G. Romli, “Siswi-siswi Kristen Pun Terpaksa Berjilbab: Kewajiban Busana 
Muslim’ (Even Christrian students have forced to wear veil: Muslim female dress 
obligation),” Jurnal Perempuan, 2008, http://www.apakabar.ws/content/view/3429/. 
(Accessed 6 June 2011). 
24 Kamil, “Progressive Shari’a Perspectives,” p. 135. 
25 Kamil, et al., Syariah Islam dan HAM: Dampak Perda Syariah terhadap Kebebasan Sipil, 
Hak-hak Perempuan dan Non-Muslim (The implementation of Shari’a Islam in regional 
autonomy era: its implications toward civil rights, women rights, and non-Muslim 
rights) (Jakarta: CRCS UIN & KAS, 2007), p. 135. 
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refused, their parents were required to declare their children as non-
Muslims.  
Research by the Wahid Institute also states that non-Muslim 
women in Padang (West Sumatra) and Bulukumba (South Sulawesi) 
are obliged to wear veil after the implementation of shari>’ah bylaws. 
One of non-Muslim students reported that she felt stressed wearing 
veil. She thinks that she lives in the community which hates her. This is 
because most of the people have forced her to obey the regulations 
that contradict with her religious belief. Besides, her Christian friends 
have also accused her of converting to Islam because of her decision to 
wear Muslim female dress.26 Hence, one of the Christian leaders in 
Padang stated that the enactment of shari>’ah bylaws had caused a 
serious psychological problem for non-Muslim students.  
Discrimination against religious minorities has also occurred in 
Aceh, particularly after the implementation of sections of 4 and 5 of 
Provincial Regulations 5/2000 which regulate standards of dress to all 
people who live in Aceh, including non-Muslims and tourists. There 
are many Western women wearing Muslim veils around Banda Aceh. 
The obligation to wear Muslim female dress was also applied to a 
Chinese woman working at BCA (secular bank).27  
Perda No. 5/2003 on the use of the headscarf for Muslim women 
in Bulukumba (South Sulawesi) takes a different approach. Non-
Muslims in this area have been told to put on a headscarf at certain 
events, even though they are not subject of this shari>’ah bylaw. One of 
the respondents of research that was conducted by Rohaiza Ahmad 
Asi  witnessed a situation where outsiders entering Muslim villages 
were told to put on the headscarf.28 Relating to this situation, 
representatives from local community in Bulukumba stated that 
shari>’ah bylaws have already breed intolerance.  
The above examples clearly show that shari>’ah bylaws that are 
applied to minorities violate of religious liberties. Besides, the 
regulations also lack a spirit to protect diversity of people’s belief in 
 
26 A. Wahid (ed.), Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di Indonesia (the 
Illusion of Islamic State: Expansion of Islamic Transnational Movements in Indonesia) 
(Jakarta: LibForAll Foundation, 2009), p. 140. 
27 Kamil, “Progressive Shari’a Perspectives,” p. 135 
28 Rohaiza Ahmad Asi, Sulawesi: Aspirations of Local Muslims (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam 
School of International Studies Working Paper series, 2007), pp. 8-12. 
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Indonesia. Unfortunately, discrimination toward religious minorities 
continues because even strong non-religious parties frequently use 
shari>’ah bylaws for their religious purposes. As a result, it can be 
difficult for religious minority groups to find the appropriate agencies 
which can help them to resist the regulations which disadvantage 
them.29 In fact, shari>’ah bylaws not only ignore legal pluralism, but also 
the fact that Indonesia is a multi-faith community. It is therefore no 
surprise that the rights of other religious groups are not respected by 
shari>’ah bylaws.30 
Meanwhile, Pramono U. Tanthowi’s research about the application 
of shari>’ah bylaws in Cianjur31 also vividly depicts discriminatory 
practices against non-Muslims. The enactment of shari>’ah bylaws in 
several cases has triggered prejudice and bitter conflict between 
religious communities. In fact, there are several incidents in which 
non-Muslims were forced to comply with one or more shari>’ah 
stipulations. For example, individuals including a post office employee, 
a teacher in a public school, and students of a state high school were 
forced to wear Muslim dress in the office each Friday. Ironically, 
shari>’ah bylaws in Cianjur are also often used by hard-line Muslim 
groups to attack property owned by religious minorities. For example, 
in 2001 hard-line Muslims indiscriminately attacked and demolished 
non-Muslim restaurants. In other cases, they also expelled several non-
Muslim families by forcing them to go to other settlements.32 This calls 
into question claims from proponents of shari>’ah bylaws about their 
respect toward religious minorities. Such claims can, in fact, be seen as 
little more than political promises, aimed at convincing other groups to 
believe their agenda without any serious effort at implementation. 
It is important to note that discrimination and violations of the 
rights of religious minorities not only take place in non-Muslim groups, 
but they also violate the civil liberties of Muslim groups. Such attacks 
usually target groups which are seen as deviant. Ahmadiyah is one 
example of an Islamic group which has suffered discrimination 
 
29 Salim, “The Shari’a Bylaws and Human Rights,” pp. 19-20. 
30 Ibid., p. 5 
31 T.P. Daniels and ‘Pramono U. Tanthowi, “Muslims and Tolerance; Non-Muslim 
Minorities under Sharia in Indonesia,” Cont Islam, no. 3 (2009), pp. 317-320. 
32 Tanthowi, “Shari’a and the Fantasy of Nationalism,” pp. 24-25. 
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because its followers believe in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet. 
According to a number of shari >’ah bylaws, Ahmadiyah damages Islam 
because it clearly follows the path and concept of apostasy (riddah). 
The status of apostasy in the shari>’ah context not only applies to 
people who convert from Islam to another religion, but also for people 
whose and practices deviate from mainstream Islam.33 Certainly, this 
concept is seen as legitimate by a majority of people who live in 
regions in which shar>i’a bylaws are implemented. As a result, 
Ahmadiyah can be seen as having been victimised by some Muslim 
groups. Ahmadiyah members also are often expelled from their houses 
and forced to move to other regions.  
Another impact of shari>’ah bylaws on religious minorities is that 
many of them face difficulties in building places of worship. For 
example, although non-Muslims in Cianjur have followed all 
procedures and fulfilled all requirements to obtain approval to build a 
place of worship, some Muslim groups remain opposed to their 
proposal. Similarly, this has also occurred at the national level, as 
evidenced by the growing numbers of churches and church institutions 
which have been destroyed by hard-line Muslims.34 Interestingly, 
CSRC’s research  has confirmed that in areas where shari>’ah bylaws 
apply, non-Muslims often experience damage to their place of worship. 
Minority Christian groups are forbidden to worship or hear mass in 
their own homes. This research also reveals that 74 % respondents 
from non-Muslim groups stated they have experienced difficulties in 
worshipping.35 It can be said that shari>’ah bylaws promote intolerance 
and discrimination against the rights of worship of other groups.  
Instead of protecting the rights of religious minorities, some 
regional governments in Indonesia support discrimination and 
intolerance toward non-Muslims. This fact can be seen from the local 
organisational structure in the Ministry of Religious Affairs of Cianjur. 
The Ministry of Religious Affairs in Indonesia was actually created to 
deal with religious affairs to all religions. As a result, all religious 
groups should be represented. Nevertheless, there is no office or 
officials in charge of non-Muslim services in the Ministry of Religious 
 
33 Kamil, “Progressive Shari’a Perspectives,” pp. 142-143.  
34 Tanthowi, “Shari’a and the Fantasy of Nationalism,” p. 25. 
35 Kamil, Syariah Islam dan HAM, pp. 190-194. 

Ahmad Fuad Fanani
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 05, Number 01, June 2011 
28 
Affairs in Cianjur. Non-Muslims have to go to the provincial level of 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Bandung if they encounter 
problems relating to their religious.36 Ironically, this discrimination is 
not only in terms of service, but also in budgeting matters. Hence, 
entire budgets are allocated exclusively for Muslims and religious 
minorities do not receive anything from the Ministry. This situation 
certainly contradicts the Indonesian constitution which requires 
neutrality in dealing with all religions.  
Shari >’ah bylaws in many regions have undermined the civil rights 
of religious minorities. It has been argued from the CSRC’s research 
that many non Muslims have experienced difficulties in becoming civil 
servants (29.5 %), receiving subsidies from local governments (12 %), 
and opening places of business during Ramadan (13 %). Besides, some 
groups have also encountered obstacles in becoming leaders because 
they are non-Muslims.37 Opportunities to become a civil servant are 
most often accorded to the majority. It is not surprising, because under 
Islamic rule, non-Muslims cannot be appointed as caliph or president. 
Shari >’ah bylaws also create a paradigm in which non-Muslims’ 
leadership skills and other qualities are seen as inferior to Muslims. 
Proponents of shari>’ah bylaws believe that non-Muslims’ status under 
shari>’ah can be understood by looking the concept of dhimmi> (non-
Muslims under Muslim rule). According to this concept, non-Muslims 
are allowed to live under Islamic rule and Muslims should regard them 
religious. Yet, non-Muslims have to obey Islamic law. They also have 
to pay jizyah (a form of poll tax) to guarantee their loyalty towards the 
country and the Islamic government protecting their security.38  
However, the concept of dhimmi> (non-Muslims under Muslim rule) 
has actually been criticized by Islamic scholars. For example, Abdullahi 
Ahmed an-Na’im argues that shari>’ah in the modern era is in fact 
incompatible with international relations and human rights.39 
According to him, shari>’ah’s rigid categorization of territories (da>r al-
Isla>m (Islamic territories) and da>r al-h}arb (non-Islamic territories) and of 
 
36 Tanthowi, “Shari’a and the Fantasy of Nationalism,” pp. 27-28. 
37 Kamil, Syariah Islam dan HAM, pp. 201-203. 
38 Nadirsyah Hosen, “Religion and the Indonesian Constitution: A Recent Debate,” 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 36, no. 3 (October 2005), p. 435. 
39 Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, “Religious Minorities under Islamic Law and the Limits of 
Cultural Relativism,” Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 9, no 1 (1987): pp. 1-18. 
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people (Muslims and dhimmi> or non-Muslims) is morally untenable and 
practically unfeasible in the contemporary world. From non-Muslims’ 
point of view, under the term of dhimmi>, they would be the second-
class citizens. Indeed, non-Muslims are afraid that the concept of 
dhimmi> would be applied to them in the future.40 Since the rights of 
religious minorities are not protected by shari>’ah bylaws, the 
implementation of such laws often causes them to feel like outsiders or 
half citizens. They also feel that their religious liberties are being 
violated.41 In accordance to Indonesia’s Constitution, discrimination 
toward non-Muslims through the concept of dhimmi> is inconsistent 
with the notion of equality before the law. Thus, the Indonesian 
government should protect religious minorities and reevaluate the 
existence of shari>’ah bylaws. 
To fully understand the implications of shari>’ah bylaws for 
religious minorities, it is important to consider the views of non-
Muslims. Bertholomeus Bolong, for example, has argued that the 
implementation of shari>’ah bylaws can be seen as a ‘soft’ approach to 
introducing Islamic law as the basis for the Indonesian state.42 Bolong 
also thinks that the enactment of shari>’ah bylaws in a plural and 
multicultural state like Indonesia will endanger national unity. In fact, 
the application of shari>’ah bylaws can trigger discrimination, 
intimidation, and force to obey the same regulations as Muslims which 
in contravention of human rights. This situation can also easily trigger 
religious conflict in Indonesia. Most Christians in regions where 
shari>’ah bylaws have been implemented have also stated that they feel 
oppressed by these laws. For example, a Christian in Padang has stated 
that shari>’ah bylaws tend to dismiss the existence of Christian 
communities and other religious communities outside Islam. In fact, 
the number of Christians in Padang is approximately 22,000.43 
Therefore, the enactment of shari>’ah bylaws in this area indirectly 
 
40 Nadirsyah Hosen, Shari’a & Constitutional Reform in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2007). 
41 Salim, “Muslim Politics in Indonesia,” p. 131. 
42 Bertholomeus Bolong “Formalisasi Syariat Islam di Indonesia: Perspektif Gereja 
Katolik (the formalisation of Shari’a Islam in Indonesia: The perspective of Catholic 
Church), Al-Mawarid, XIV (2006), pp. 154-156. 
43 Romli, “Siswi-siswi Kristen Pun Terpaksa Berjilbab”.  
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ignores a huge number of people who should have equal rights as 
other Indonesian citizens.  
Some Suggestions for the Protection of Religious Minorities  
As demonstrated above, shari>’ah bylaws directly contravene 
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. This is because from the 
beginning of its independence, Indonesia has adopted an ideology that 
expresses dedication to Unity in Diversity (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika) and 
religious pluralism. This ideology, known as Pancasila, does not accord 
preferential status to the majority.44 As a means to fairly meet 
conflicting demands, Indonesia is neither a religious nor secular state 
but a Pancasila state. As stated in the  1945 Constitution, Article 29 (1 
and 2), “Indonesia is based on The One Mighty God”, and “the state 
guarantees the freedom of religion with the obligation to practice their 
respected religion”. The state recognises equality among citizens 
irrespective of their religious, ethnic, and gender backgrounds.45  
As a consequence, the government must be responsible to protect 
religious minorities from any discrimination by providing them with 
effective legal remedies. This policy must be emphasized firmly in the 
constitution.46 Because of the importance the rights of minority 
groupes, the state must evaluate all of the laws which contain 
discriminatory ideas such as shari>’ah bylaws. Besides, the state must 
make sure that all of the regional regulations correspond with the 
principle of nationality, plurality, equality, tolerance, and justice. 
According to R.E. Elson,47 great political morality and will are required 
to make this a reality. This is likely to be challenging, however, given 
that politics often prioritises pragmatism over moral considerations.  
It is important to note that many shari>’ah bylaws reflect a narrow, 
text-based and traditional interpretation of shari>’ah. As a consequence, 
religious minorities and other Muslim groups which have different 
opinions from the hard-line Islamic groups often become the victims 
of such interpretation. Besides, the formalisation of shari>’ah through 
bylaws frequently only represents shari>’ah in the form of its formalistic 
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44 Eliraz, Islam in Indonesia, pp. 78-79. 
45 Hara, “Pancasila and the Perda Syari’ah Debates,” p. 39. 
46 Salim, “Muslim Politics in Indonesia,” p. 135. 
47 R. E. Elson, “Nationalism, Islam, ‘Secularism’ and the State in Contemporary 
Indonesia,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol 64, no 3 (2010), p. 340 
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sense, without applying its substantive meaning. In fact, the 
substantive meaning of shari>’ah is to encourage peace, justice, 
humanity, wisdom, and prosperity.48 As Nadirsyah Hosen has noted, 
under the substantive shari>’ah approach, the flexibility of Islamic law is 
assured and citizens’ constitutional rights are guaranteed.49 Therefore, 
Muslims should consider the substantive approach to shari>’ah and 
show that shari>’ah does not necessarily cause political chaos or inflict 
harm upon religious minorities.  
Conclusion 
Shari >’ah bylaws represent an old agenda which emerged again 
during the regional autonomy era. The regional autonomy agenda 
which was intended to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of 
bureaucracy has often been misused by local leaders to create shari>’ah 
bylaws. This is because many local leaders view shari>’ah bylaws as an 
opportunity to strengthen their power. The enactment of shari>’ah 
bylaws also  represents a renewed attempt of formalization  of shari>’ah 
at the regional level, after their failure to do so through open 
democratic processes at the national level. Besides, Aceh’s success in 
implementing shari>’ah bylaws has also triggered greater interest in 
shari>’ah bylaws in other regions. 
The introduction of such bylaws has many negative implications 
for religious minorities in Indonesia. This is because people of religious 
minorities are forced to observe the same regulations as the so-called 
maintsream Muslims. Shari>’ah bylaws have also caused discrimination 
against religious minorities. In many regions in which shari>’ah bylaws 
have been implemented, religious minorities have lost their rights to 
religious freedom, peaceful worship, and appropriate living. Indeed, 
the status of non-Muslims under shari>’ah bylaws can potentially place 
them as the second-class citizens. In order to stop the negative 
implications of shari>’ah bylaws, the Indonesian government should 
protect religious minorities’ rights through the Constitution which 
must be obeyed by all Indonesians. At the same time, Muslims should 
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48 M. Wahid, “Syariat Islam, Negara, dan Ancaman Pluralitas: Kritik atas Perda ‘Syariat 
Islam’ di Indonesia” (Shari’a Islam, State, and Threat of Plurality: The Critiques of 
Shari’a Bylaws in Indonesia), Tashwirul Afkar, no 20 (2006). 
49 Hosen, Shari’a & Constitutional Reform, p. 233. 
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also consider the true meaning and substance of shari>’ah, rather than 
only focusing on its formal implementation. [] 
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